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MOTHERS AND DISPARATE TREATMENT:
THE GHOST OF MARTIN MARIETTA*
MARTHA CHAMALLAS**
NY discussion of the employment rights of women, particularly the
1 tatus of working mothers, should start with the topic of mothers and
disparate treatment. Disparate treatment is by far the most frequently
used theory of liability under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1
The gravamen of a disparate treatment case is a showing of differential
treatment based on sex-that the employer treated a female employee less
favorably than a similarly situated male employee or that the employer had
one rule for its male employees and another rule for its female employ-
ees.2 The ban against disparate treatment is supposed to guarantee equal
treatment of men and women in the workplace and put an end to double
standards based on sex. 3
As conceptualized by the courts, disparate treatment requires proof of
discriminatory intent.4 Courts do not always agree, however, on what con-
* This Article grew out of a speech delivered on November 7, 1998 at the
Thirty-Third Annual Villanova Law Review Symposium honoring the late Mary Joe
Frug, entitled Still Hostile After All These Years? Gender, Work & Family Revisited.
** Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. I wish to thank
Ruth Colker for her comments on this Article and Heather Zink and Joel Hurt for
their research assistance.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964). A huge majority of cases brought under Title
VII allege disparate treatment. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The
Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REv. 983, 989
(1991) (noting that only 101 of 7,613 employment civil rights cases brought in
1989 alleged disparate impact discrimination). But see HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR., CIVIL
RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 218 (1997) (discussing disparate im-
pact and disparate treatment theories of liability and stating that " [ i ] t bears em-
phasis that these categories are not analytically airtight and that particular
employer practices, in the hands of capable advocates, may implicate two or more
modes of proof").
2. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (providing
landmark discussion of disparate treatment theory under Title VII). In Teamsters,
the Court stated:
"Disparate treatment" .. is the most easily understood type of dis-
crimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than
others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof
of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be
inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment. Undoubtedly
disparate treatment was the most obvious evil Congress had in mind
when it enacted Title VII.
Id.
3. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989) (stating that,
under Title VII, "gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions").
4. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 35 n.15 (noting that "[p]roof of discriminatory
motive is critical ... ."); BARBARA LINDEMAN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT Dis-
(337)
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stitutes discriminatory intent, nor how a party can prove intent. Suffice it
to say that although disparate treatment may stem from hostility or animus
towards women, most often disparate treatment is a product of stereotyp-
ing and habitual attitudes about the "normal" or "proper" behavior of
men and women. Theoretically, if a female plaintiff can show that she was
treated differently than a similarly situated man because of an employer's
sex-based stereotype about how women do or should behave, she should
prevail in a Tide VII disparate treatment suit.5
When it comes to employers' treatment of mothers as employees, the
ban against disparate treatment should prohibit employers from making
assumptions about how individual women will combine their careers and
families. If the ban on disparate treatment applies with equal force to
working mothers, employers should not be able to presume that once a
woman has her first child, or a subsequent child, she will drop out of the
workforce, or that she will want to work only part-time. Nor should em-
ployers be able to presume that working mothers are less committed to
their jobs, or less interested in advancement, travel or demanding new
assignments. This view of the ban on disparate treatment means that Title
VII challenges the conventional wisdom that a woman will place her family
obligations before her responsibilities on the job. In an essay on the cul-
tural meanings of motherhood, Carol Sanger has aptly expressed the phi-
losophy behind Title VII's ban on disparate treatment of mothers.6 She
argues that we should be mindful that a woman's status as a mother is not
the only status she has and should guard against the cultural tendency to
reduce a woman to the experiences she has as a mother-that is, to mis-
take motherhood for "the whole show."7
As I see it, the ban against disparate treatment is designed to dispel
and resist these traditional views of, and generalizations about, working
mothers. So conceived, the ban on disparate treatment will not solve the
work/family conflict for women who experience actual, rather than per-
ceived, conflicts because they find that there are just not enough hours in
the day. For those women whose domestic responsibilities make it impos-
sible for them to meet the requirements of a given position, the formal
CRIMINATION LAw 10-11 (1996) (stating that "[i]n an individual disparate treatment
case, the central question is always whether the defendant's actions were motivated
by discriminatory intent").
5. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240; Los Angeles Dep't of Water &
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978) (stating that "[i]n forbidding
employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress in-
tended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women
resulting from sex stereotypes"). See generally Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content
of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161 (1995) (analyzing connections between proof of
disparate treatment, stereotyping and cognitive bias in Title VII cases).
6. See generally Carol Sanger, M is for the Many Things, 1 S. CAL. REv. L. &
WOMEN'S STUD. 15 (1992).
7. Id. at 31.
[ ol. 44: p. 337
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equality promised by Tide VII's prohibition of disparate treatment may be
of little use. Disparate treatment claims, however, should guarantee that
women who do manage successfully to combine work and family are not
penalized simply because their employers believe that they cannot do it.
To determine whether Tide VII is accomplishing this goal, I reviewed
recent disparate treatment cases brought by mothers of young children
who claimed that their employers discriminated against them because of
their status as mothers. Compared to the number of claims brought for
sexual harassment and other forms of gender bias, there are few such
"mother-discrimination" cases. This is somewhat perplexing because I
doubt that disparate treatment of mothers with young children is a thing
of the past. In fact, my sense is that these days women experience sex
discrimination in employment not when they enter the workplace, nor
when they marry (although marriage can prompt employers to ask ques-
tions about plans for having a family). Instead, I suspect that the moment
of discrimination arrives for many women when they have their first child
and employers start thinking of them as working mothers. My hypothesis
is that there are few of these mother-discrimination cases because they are
so difficult for plaintiffs to win.
The legal story of mothers and disparate treatment dates back to the
late 1960s when Title VII was still a new law and had yet to be interpreted
by the United States Supreme Court. In fact, the first Title VII case de-
cided by the Supreme Court was a disparate treatment case involving dis-
crimination against mothers with pre-school age children. I am speaking
of Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,8 which was ultimately decided by the
Supreme Court in 1971.
That case involved a hiring policy instituted by Martin Marietta in its
Florida plant. Martin Marietta refused to hire women with pre-school age
children, even though it employed men with pre-school aged children. 9
Ida Phillips, a mother with seven children ranging in age from three to
fifteen years old, challenged the policy. 10 She wanted ajob as a trainee on
an assembly line."' This was predominantly a "woman's" job-it was intri-
cate work requiring assembly of small electronic components. 12 Most sig-
nificantly, between seventy-five to eighty percent of those hired for the
position were women.13
Relying on these bottom-line figures, the company argued that it did
not discriminate on the basis of sex, that its gender-specific policy on
8. 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
9. See id. at 543.
10. See Oral Argument in United States Supreme Court at 4, Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (No. 73) [hereinafter Oral Argument].
11. See id.
12. Id. at 50.
13. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 543 (1971). Addition-
ally, 70% to 75% of the applicants for the job were women. See id.
1999] 339
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mothers did not amount to sex discrimination. 14 The company asserted
that Phillips had not been rejected solely because she was a woman, but
because of the confluence of two factors-her sex and her status as a
mother.1 5 Martin Marietta argued that this "sex plus" disparate treatment
did not violate Title VII because the employer did not seek to exclude all
subgroups of women. 16
The employer's argument was successful in the lower courts. The dis-
trict court concluded that it was proper for employers to treat employed
mothers and fathers differently, reasoning that "[t]he responsibilities of
men and women with small children are not the same and employers are
entitled to recognize those different responsibilities in establishing hiring
policies."1 7 Affirming, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit ruled that "sex plus" policies did not violate Title VII because Con-
gress could not have intended to require employers to treat working
mothers and working fathers exactly alike.1 8 The appellate panel in 1969
thought it would be foolish to ascribe such an "irrational purpose" to Con-
gress because "[t] he common experience of Congressmen is surely not so
far removed from that of mankind in general."19 For the court, gender
difference was naturalized. There was a presumption that women would
and should put their family obligations first and that this necessarily would
result in lower productivity in the workplace for working mothers. 20 What
many would now call stereotypes about working mothers (that they are less
committed and that their family responsibilities will inevitably prevent
them from being employees who can be counted upon) were apparently
regarded as truisms by some of the Fifth Circuit judges.
Even at this early moment in the Act's history, however, a strong egali-
tarian dissent was registered by Chief Judge John Brown, who unsuccess-
fully argued that the Fifth Circuit ought to rehear the case en banc. 21 He
read the legislative history of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, enacted one
year before Title VII, as evidencing a specific concern for the economic
standing and status of working mothers, including working mothers with
pre-school aged children. 22 By the late 1960s, it was clear that women's
14. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 411 F.2d 1, 2 (5th Cir. 1969), vacated,
400 U.S. 542 (1971).
15. See id. at 4.
16. See id.
17. Oral Argument, supra note 10, at 6.
18. See Martin Marietta, 411 F.2d at 4.
19. Id.
20. See id. (referring to "differences between the normal relationships of
working fathers and working mothers to their pre-school age children").
21. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 416 F.2d 1257, 1258 (5th Cir. 1969),
vacated, 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (Brown, J., dissenting) (dissenting from denial of re-
hearing en banc).
22. See id. at 1260 (stating that "mothers, working mothers, and working
mothers of pre-school children were the specific objectives of governmental
solicitude").
[Vol. 44: p. 337
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representation in the labor force was increasing steadily and that many of
these new entrants were mothers with young children. 23 Rather than view-
ing women's employment as supplemental or secondary, Judge Brown
characterized women's earnings as "essential to the economic needs of
their families." 24 He believed that Congress intended to require employ-
ers to treat mothers and fathers alike and to prohibit employers from as-
suming that mothers' parental obligations would make them an unreliable
or unfit employees. 25 For Judge Brown, the sex-plus theory employed by
the panel directly undermined the language and legislative intent of Title
VII. He warned that "[i]f 'sex plus' stands, the Act is dead."2 6
This cultural conflict about the employment of mothers was brought
to the Supreme Court by some of the finest civil rights:lawyers of the time.
Representing the plaintiff in the Supreme Court were William L. Robin-
son and Jack Greenberg, lawyers from the NAACP 27 who would later ar-
gue the famous Griggs v. Duke Power Co. case. 28 Although Phillips was
white and did not allege race discrimination, the NAACP did not want to
pass up this opportunity to argue the first Title VII case to the high
Court.29 The ACLU and NOW also filed amicus briefs on behalf of Phil-
lips, under the signatures of Dorothy Kenyon, Norman Dorsen, Pauli Mur-
ray and Kenneth Davidson. 30 These prominent lawyers from feminist and
black civil rights organizations united to fight against both race and sex
discrimination in the early years of Title VII. Their common enemy was
stereotyping and deep-seated traditional attitudes about gender and race
23. See id. at 1261 n.15 (citing 1963 statistics indicating that two out of five
working mothers had school-aged children, while one out of five had children
under three years old).
24. Id. at 1261.
25. See id. (noting that "neither an employer nor a reviewing Court can-
absent proof of 'business justification . . .'-assume that a mother of pre-school
children will, from parental obligations, be an unreliable, unfit employee").
26. Id. at 1260.
27. See Brief for Petitioner at 1, Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542
(1971) (No. 173) (listing attorneys representing Ida Phillips). The other attorneys
on the brief for Phillips were James M. Nabrit, III, Norman C. Amaker, Lowell
Johnston, Vilma Martinez Singer, Earl M. Johnson, George Cooper and Christo-
pher Clancy.
28. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971) (prohibiting use of
high school diploma requirement or general aptitude test as qualification for em-
ployment where neither was shown to be substantially related to job performance
and where both operated to exclude disproportionate numbers of African
Americans).
29. See Elaine Jones, Director-Counsel of the NAACP Legal and Educational
Fund (LDF), Speech at the American Association of Law Schools Annual Meeting (Jan. 8,
1999).
30. See Brief for the ACLU at 1, Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 452
(1971) (No. 73); Brief for the National Organization of Women at. 1, Phillips v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 452 (1971) (No. 73). The other attorneys on
these amicus briefs were Melvin L. Wulf (ACLU), Jacob D. Hyman (NOW), Faith
Seidenberg (NOW), Marguerite Rawalt (NOW) and Phineas Indritz (NOW).
1999]
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that had locked women and minorities into inferior jobs and had pro-
duced higher unemployment rates for both groups.
3 1
Ida Phillips won in the Supreme Court. The Court issued a short per
curiam opinion rejecting the "sex plus" approach of the Fifth Circuit. 32 In
a straightforward application of disparate treatment theory, the Court
ruled that Title VII did not permit an employer to have two different hir-
ing policies, one for men and one for women.
33
The case was significant because it meant that there would be no rou-
tine exception to the ban on disparate treatment of men and women in
the workplace. The holding was that mothers and fathers should be
treated the same for purposes of determining their employment rights, at
least with respect to establishing the elements of plaintiff's prima facie
case. The Court's acknowledgment that sex-plus discrimination was never-
theless discrimination was particularly important because employers virtu-
ally never have policies that exclude all women from all employment
opportunities. Discrimination is almost always selective in its application.
The case was not a total victory for women's rights, however. The per
curiam opinion also stated that an employer might successfully defend its
disparate treatment of mothers with young children by proving a bona
fide occupational qualification (BFOQ), if it could show that conflicting
family obligations were "demonstrably more relevant to job performance
for a woman than for a man."34 This comment produced a stinging re-
sponse by Justice Marshall in his concurring opinion. He strongly dis-
puted that an individual woman could lawfully be denied employment
even if most women worked a double shift (i.e., one at home and at one at
work) and had family responsibilities that arguably threatened to interfere
31. The briefs on behalf of Phillips, moreover, reflected an appreciation of
the interlocking nature of race and sex discrimination and emphasized that em-
ployer policies of excluding women with pre-school aged children would have a
disproportionate impact on minority women. Thus, it was noted that a larger per-
centage of non-white mothers with children under six years of age worked outside
the home (45%), compared to white mothers with such children (27%). See Brief
for United States as Amicus Curiae at 5-6, Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400
U.S. 542 (1971) (No. 73) (arguing that burden of exclusion will fall most heavily
on Negroes and other non-white families headed by women who are "least able to
afford restrictions upon their employment opportunities"); Brieffor Petitioner, supra
note 27, at 13 (noting that black women will suffer "double discrimination" be-
cause they tend to be breadwinners for their families and are most oppressed
group of workers in society). For more contemporary discussions of the intersec-
tion of race and sex discrimination under Title VII, see MARTHA CHAMALI.AS, IN-
TRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 245-50 (1999); Kimberle Crenshaw,
Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidis-
crimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139
1989.
32. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 543-44 (1971).
33. See id. at 544 (noting that court of appeals erred in construing statute to
permit "one hiring policy for women and another for men").
34. Id.
[Vol. 44: p. 337
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with job performance. 35 Justice Marshall stressed that stereotypes or tradi-
tional views about the "proper domestic, roles" of women should not be
the basis upon which employment policies are constructed.3 6 Later deci-
sions would vindicate Marshall's viewpoint; as a defense, the BFOQ would
be narrowly construed and employers would no longer attempt to justify
explicit disparate treatment of mothers by asserting a BFOQ.3 7
Although the victory for the plaintiff may seem unexceptional today,
the result in Martin Marietta may not have been preordained. Many of the
Justices held traditional views about working mothers, perhaps even Chief
Justice Burger, the author of the per curiam opinion. In his book The
Brethren, Bob Woodward reports about the case:
Later that term, in a sex discrimination case [Phillips v. Mar-
tin Marietta], Burger wanted to rule in favor of a company that
refused to hire women with preschool-age children. He strongly
supported the company's policy. "I will never hire a woman
clerk," Burger told his clerks. A woman would have to leave work
at 6 P.M. to go home and cook dinner for her husband. His first
clerk back in 1956 at the Court of Appeals had been a woman, he
told them. It had not worked out well at all. As far as he was
concerned, an employer could fire whomever he wanted and for
whatever reason. That was the boss's prerogative.
When it was suggested that his position amounted to a decla-
ration that part of the Civil Rights Act was unconstitutional, Bur-
ger angrily shut off the discussion. He didn't want to argue legal
niceties. His experience showed him that women with young
children just didn't work out as well as men in the same jobs.
The employer was within his rights.
At conference, however, the majority voted the other way.
Burger returned to his chambers and announced that he wanted
a per curiam [unsigned opinion] drafted, ruling that unless the
company could show that conflicting family obligations were
somehow more relevant to job performance for women than for
men, the company would have to lose. "It was the best that I
35. See id. (Marshall, J.,' concurring) (disagreeing with majority's conclusion
that BFOQ could be established by showing that "even the vast majority [of wo-
men] with pre-school-age children have family responsibilities that interfere with
job performance and that men do not usually have such responsibilities").
36. Id. at 545 (Marshall,J., concurring). Justice Marshall stated, "I fear that in
this case, where the issue is not squarely before us, the Court has fallen into the
trap of assuming that the Act permits ancient canards about the proper role of
women to be a basis for discrimination." Id.
37. See International Union, UAW v.Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 201
(1991) (noting that "[t]he BFOQ defense is written narrowly, and this Court has
read it narrowly"); see also Stephen F. Befort, BFOQ Revisited: Johnson Controls
Halts the Expansion of the Defense to Intentional Sex Discrimination, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 5,
11 (1991) (stating that BFOQ defense is, of necessity, quite narrow).
1999]
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could do," Burger told his amazed clerks. The decision became
another liberal opinion for the Burger Court.3
8
Woodward's account of the Chief Justice's attitudes about working
mothers is supported by the report of the oral argument in the case.
Although the transcript does not disclose which Justice posed the various
questions, one of the very first questions asked of Phillips' attorney was
whether Title VII would prohibit a federal judge from refusing to hire a
"lady law clerk" with an infant child.3 9 It was only after the Justice was
assured, amidst laughter in the courtroom, that the Act did not cover fed-
eral judges that the subject of oral argument returned to the case before
it.40 Later in the oral argument, aJustice asked Phillips' attorney whether
the Constitution might prohibit a federal judge from instituting a policy
similar to Martin Marietta's, even though the Martin Marietta case involved
a private employer and clearly did not raise any constitutional issues.
4 1
38. BOB WOODWARD & ScoTr ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 123 (1979).
39. See Oral Argument, supra note 10, at 6-7. The colloquy included:
Q Does this act reach the government as the employer?
A No, Your Honor; it does not reach government as an employer. It
does, however, reach state employment services. I don't-there might
be some question at some point or other whether or not that reaches
government employment, but I don't think so; no.
Q Then if the Federal Judge, as a matter of general policy, would decline
to hire law clerk who had an infant child, a lady law clerk, but was
willing to hire men whose wives had infant children, they would be in
violation of the statute, if the statute applies to them?
A If the statute applies; yes, but it does not apply to Federal judges, of
course.
Q You are sure it doesn't apply to Federal judges?
(Laughter)




41. See id. at 13-14. The colloquy started with a question about the fairness
and legality of exempting the federal government from Title VII's prohibitions,
before a Justice again raised the federal judge/female clerk hypothetical:
Q Do you see any possible problems of equal protection issues with the
government and its millions and millions of employees not being sub-
ject to the act and private employers subject? ....
A No. I hadn't thought of this problem to date, Your Honor, and I don't
see that it's a problem at all. I don't even understand the suggestion.
But I would note, however, that the 14th and the Fifth Amendments to
the constitution cover government employment and it prohibit the
government fr6m discriminating in its employment ....
Q Well, the [sic] are you suggesting that perhaps Federal Judges, for
example, could not have such a rule as I suggested?
A Oh, I am suggesting that, but they would not be based on the act; it
would be based on the Fifth Amendment.
Id. Title VII was amended in 1972 to cover state and local government employers.
See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2 86 Stat.
103, 103 (1972). Additionally, almost all federal employment is also covered by
Title VII through separate provisions. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1994) (listing
8
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Aside from this concern for the Justices' own prerogatives as employ-
ers, the oral argument in Martin Marietta also exemplified the culture wars
of the time regarding employment of women and mothers. The tradition-
alist view was evidenced by several questions from the Justices and by the
fact that the very subject of women and employment often evoked laugh-
ter, suggesting that the issue was not being taken entirely seriously.
At one point during oral argument, the Chief Justice openly ex-
pressed his view that women were naturally more suited for some jobs,
indicating that he believed in some of the stereotypes that the fledgling
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the civil rights
groups were protesting. In an exchange with counsel for Martin Marietta,
Chief Justice Burger stated that he would take judicial notice "from many
years of contact with industry" that the reason Martin Marietta had em-
ployed so high a percentage of women in the small parts assemblyjob that
Phillips sought was that "women are manually much more adept than men
and they do this kind of work better than men do it .... -42 The Chief
Justice also voiced the opinion that "most men hire women as secretaries,
because they are better at it than men."43 There was laughter in the court-
room when the attorney for Martin Marietta responded that he was "so
pleased" that the ChiefJustice had made that point. The attorney felt that
employees of federal judiciary among other federal government units covered by
prohibition on discrimination). Most of the remaining federal employees are pro-
tected by either the Civil Rights Act of 1991 or the Congressional Accountability
Act of 1995. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 117, 2 U.S.C. § 601 (1994) (setting forth
provisions of Civil Rights Act of 1991 pertaining to House of Representatives and
legislative branch agencies); Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 §§ 101, 201,
2 U.S.C. § 1301, 1311 (1994).
42. Oral Argument, supra note 10, at 50. Although the names of the question-
ers are not generally revealed in the oral argument transcripts, the response by
counsel for Martin Marietta indicated that he was answering ChiefJustice Burger's
questions at this point:
Q Well, I have assumed up to this time, Mr. Senterfitt, that the reason
you have 75 or 80 percent women is that again something that I would
take judicial notice of, from many years of contact with industry, that
women are manually much more adept than men and they do this
kind of work better than men do it, and that's why you hire women.
A Mr. Chief Justice -
Q For just the same reason that most men hire women as secretaries,
because they are better at it than men.
A I am so pleased - I couldn't say that because it appears to fall into this
stereotype preconception concept that -
(Laughter) ....
Q The Department ofJustice, I am sure, doesn't have any male secretar-
ies. This is an indication of it. They hire women secretaries because
they are better and you hire women assembly people because they are
better and you make the distinction between women who have small
children and women who don't; so it appears on the record.
Id. at 50-51.
43. Id. at 51.
1999]
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he could not make such a statement because it fell into the category of a
stereotype or preconception. 4 4
Some portions of the oral argument in Martin Marietta are reminis-
cent of the patronizing and joking tone used by Howard Smith, the South-
ern congressman who first introduced the prohibition against sex
discrimination into Title VII, in an effort to defeat the bill. 45 Some ques-
tions during the argument create the impression that it is laughable, or at
least foolish, to believe that male and female workers are on an equal foot-
ing and can be expected to perform similar jobs. For example, the attor-
neys appearing on behalf of Phillips46 were asked whether the law would
require an employer to give "women the job of digging ditches and things
of that kind";47 whether the airlines would be forced to create the job of
steward as well as stewardess;48 and whether the Pullman company would
be prevented from deciding that "it only wanted porters" and not "porter-
esses." 49 In one revealing exchange, a Justice remarked that the plaintiff's
interpretation of Title VII would do "away with the age of chivalry."50 By
describing jobs in expressly gendered terms and expressing doubt about
the prospects of changing cultural patterns ofjob segregation, some of the
questions seem to embrace a theory of natural sexual differences and sug-
gest an unwillingness to take Title VII's ban on sex discrimination at face
value.
44. See id.
45. See Katherine Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The
Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 23 (1995) (setting forth legis-
lative history of Title VII and noting "when Smith made his motion to add sex to
the civil rights bill, his remarks were quite sexist and provoked an equally sexist
response"). Franke explains the complicated politics behind the addition of "sex"
to the list of prohibited categories under Title VII. See id. at 24-25. The motion to
add "sex" to the original bill that had prohibited only discrimination based on
race, religion, color and national origin was made by Howard Smith (D. Va.), a
conservative southerner. See id. at 23-24. Smith hoped to defeat Title VII, but in-
terestingly was in favor of passing the proposed Equal Rights Amendment. See id.
at 23. Both his remarks and those of Emanuel Celler (D. N.Y.), who was in favor of
passing Title VII (without a prohibition on sex discrimination), were dismissive of
women's employment rights and seem sexist to contemporary readers. See id.
46. See Oral Argument, supra note 10, at 1 (listing court appearances). In addi-
tion to William L. Robinson, who argued the case for Ida Phillips, Lawrence G.
Wallace, from the Office of the Solicitor General, appeared as amicus curiae for
the United States in support of Phillips. See id.
47. Id. at 16-17.
48. Id. at 25-26. When one Justice was informed that a particular airline had
hired both male stewards and female stewardesses, he asked whether it got any
passengers, suggesting that male flight attendants did not have the power to attract
the largely male group of airline passengers to the same degree as the young, un-
married women typically hired at that time as stewardesses. See id. at 26; see also id.
at 32 (reporting hypothetical question posed by Justice supposing that airline pas-
sengers prefer young women to male flight attendants). The following year, the
Fifth Circuit decided Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th
Cir. 1971) (holding that airlines could not refuse to hire men as flight attendants).
49. Oral Argument, supra note 10, at 26-27.
50. Id. at 19.
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A dismissive, or at least skeptical, attitude toward women's equality
was particularly evident when a Justice's question strayed from the facts of
the Martin Marietta litigation. For example, one Justice asked the lawyer
irom the Solicitor General's office, who appeared as amicus supporting
Ida Phillips, to explain his reference to the "Commission."5 1 When the
attorney responded that he meant the EEOC, the Justice asked him how
many members were on the Commission. 5 2 When he learned that there
were five members, the Justice asked "how many of them are women,"
invoking laughter in the courtroom. 53 When counsel replied that he be-
lieved there was one woman on the Commission, the Justice followed up
by stating, "You mean only one out of five?" getting another laugh from
those present. 54
This light, joking exchange underscores the very different response
that a charge of sex discrimination elicited from some of the Justices than
the response that would have been expected to a claim of race discrimina-
tion. Even in 1970, it is hard to imagine that a Justice of the Supreme
Court would ask how many members of the EEOC were black or Hispanic
and then joke about their low rate of representation. I suspect that the
ideology behind the jokes was the traditionalist view that disparate treat-
ment of men and women is most often benign and merely reflects deep-
seated biological and cultural differences between the sexes. The same
traditionalist ideology must also have made the first Title VII sex discrimi-
nation case a difficult one for some members of the Court.
Despite this unreceptive atmosphere, the lawyers for Ida Phillips em-
ployed a risky strategy that ultimately proved successful in the case. They
analogized sex discrimination to race discrimination and argued that
adoption of a sex-plus exception to the Act would lead to race-plus, nation-
ality-plus, and religion-plus exceptions, ultimately eviscerating the protec-
tion of the legislation.5 5 Under such a race-plus theory, for example,
counsel for plaintiff argued that an employer could lawfully "refuse to hire
Negroes with kinky hair or on the other hand, Negroes with straight
hair."56 Plaintiffs case was a straightforward one-she maintained that
Title VII's ban on disparate treatment meant that all explicit distinctions
between male and female employees were presumptively unlawful and
could only stand in those limited cases in which the employer could justify
its sex-based policy as a BFOQ.57 In a classic statement of the rationale for
the ban on disparate treatment, Phillips' attorney stated that "[t] he basic
purpose of Title VII is to ensure that women and other protected catego-
ries are not excluded or otherwise hindered in their employment opportu-
51. Id. at 27.
52. See id.
53. Id. at 27-28.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 10.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 8.
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nities on the basis of stereotypic assumptions or prejudgments about their
desirability as employees."5 8 With respect to policies on the hiring of
working mothers, plaintiff maintained that the Act required the elimina-
tion of double standards, specifically those based on the assumption that
mothers have different responsibilities toward children than do fathers.59
The key mandate was that, for purposes of establishing a prima facie case,
mothers "should be treated as individuals rather than as members of a
broad category."60
Although hardly a ringing endorsement for the fundamental equality
of women and men, the per curiam opinion in Martin Marietta did cast
doubt on the validity of stereotypical thinking and the legality of treating
mothers as domestic beings whose primary function was to care for chil-
dren. The move to analogize sex to race discrimination, which would
prove so important in later years, worked to make this first Title VII case a
notable victory for women's rights, even though neither the courts nor the
EEOC had yet placed a high priority on fighting sex discrimination in
employment. 61
In the nearly three decades since Martin Marietta, the rhetoric towards
working mothers has changed considerably. Although dismissive sex-
based comments are still made in trials and oral arguments, it is no longer
generally acceptable to describe jobs in explicitly gendered terms or to
state openly that mothers of young children should be barred from certain
types of employment. 62 In some of the recent mother-discrimination
cases in the lower courts, however, I can see the ghost of Martin Marietta,
as the old stereotypes resurface in updated, and somewhat more hidden,
forms. In keeping with the theme of this symposium, the courts' interpre-
tation of Title VII disparate treatment claims is still too often hostile to
mothers after all these years.
The case I wish to compare to Martin Marietta was brought by Diana
Piantanida, who worked as an "executive assistant" to the Development
Director for the Wyman Center, a not-for-profit organization that pro-
vided summer camp experience for inner city kids.63 Prior to Piantanida's
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. Id. at 8-9.
61. During the early years of the Act, the EEOC acquired a reputation for not
taking sex discrimination claims seriously. See SALLYJ. KENNEY, FOR WHOSE PROTEC-
TION? REPRODUCTIVE HAZARDS AND EXCLUSIONARY POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES
AND BRITAIN 169-76 (1992) (discussing EEOC enforcement history); Franke, supra
note 45, at 24-25 nn.96, 98 (explaining that EEOC did not aggressively pursue sex
discrimination cases in early years of Title VII).
62. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Asking About Gender in the Courts, 21 SIGNS: J. OF
WOMEN IN CULTURE & Soc'Y 952 (1996) (discussing narratives of female attorneys
and judges gathered by state and federal task forces on gender bias in courts). See
generally Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, The Effects of Gender in the Federal Courts
(1993), reprinted in 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 745 (1994).
63. See Piantanida v. Wyman Ctr., Inc., 927 F. Supp. 1226, 1231 (E.D. Mo.
1996), affd, 116 F.3d 340 (8th Cir. 1997).
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pregnancy, herjob was to help in fundraising efforts, including some cleri-
cal duties.64 Although no precise figures appear in the case, it seems that
many of the employees at the Wyman Center were women.6 5 The Execu-
tive Director, however, was a man.
66
When Piantanida was'ready to return to work a little over two months
after delivering her first child, she was informed that she would not get
her old job back.6 7 Instead, she was reassigned to the newly created job of
Department Secretary, with mostly clerical duties. 68 More importantly,
this new position paid approximately half of her old-salary.69 In her depo-
sition, Piantanida asserted that the Executive Director had instructed his
deputy to create a position "for a new mom to handle."70 Plaintiff be-
lieved that she had been demoted and that this new position had been
created because it was assumed that as a new mother, she would be unable
to handle the responsibilities of the Executive Assistant.7 1
Not surprisingly, the Wyman Center had a different view of the facts.
The employer claimed that plaintiff was demoted because she had not per-
formed her duties as Executive Assistant satisfactorily, and that only when
she was on maternity leave did they discover, that plaintiff had failed to
keep up with her workload. 72
This is the kind of case one would expect to be submitted to the jury.
The issue was joined-was plaintiff discriminated against because she was
a mother of an infant or was she demoted because she was an inefficient
worker? Piantanida's case never got to ajury, however, because the district
court granted summary judgment for the Wyman Center.73 Although the
plaintiff's complaint alleged that she was discriminated against based on
her status as a new mother, the court interpreted her complaint as alleg-
ing discrimination based on pregnancy, as somehow distinct from discrim-
ination based on sex.7 4 The court focused on the specific wording of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA),75 as if it were a separate cause of
64. See id.
65. See id. (describing personnel employed at Wyman Center).
66. See id.
67. See id. at 1234.
68. See id.
69. See id. (stating that salary for new position was $750 per month, approxi-
mately 50% reduction in salary).
70. Id. at 1236.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 1233-34.
73. See id. at 1243. Interestingly, the district judge (Judge Limbaugh) was also
the trial judge in Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244 (E.D. Mo.
1991), affd, 509 U.S. 502 (1993), an important Title VII case that many argue has
made it extremely difficult for plaintiffs to prove intentional race discrimination.
See, e.g., Deborah A. Calloway, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, Questioning the
Basic Assumption, 26 CONN. L. Rrv. 997 (1997) (analyzing impact of Hicks decision).
74. See Piantanida, 927 F. Supp. at 1235.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
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action from Title VII's ban on sex discrimination. 76 In doing so, the court
missed the fact that the PDA merely amplified the definition of sex under
Title VII by amending Title VII to define the terms "because of sex" or "on
the basis of sex" to include, but not be limited to, "because of or on the
basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. '77
Although defendant did not even make the argument, the court con-
cluded that "plaintiff [did] not state a cognizable disparate treatment
cause of action because her status as a "new mother" is not a protected
trait under the PDA."78 The court reasoned that unlike pregnancy or
complications from childbirth, being a new mother is not a medical condi-
tion and thus was not covered under the PDA.
79
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed
the grant of a summary judgment.8 0 The court framed the question as
whether being discriminated against because of one's status as a new par-
ent violates the PDA.8 1 There was a subtle but crucial difference between
the way the court framed the issue and the plaintiffs allegations, which at
the summary judgment stage the court was bound to accept as true. Plain-
tiff stated she was demoted because she was a new mother, that is, plaintiff
alleged sex-plus discrimination.8 2 The court reframed the issue in a gen-
der neutral way to determine whether plaintiff's status as a new parent vio-
lated the PDA.8 3 The shift in rhetoric and emphasis is evident in the
Eighth Circuit's holding:
[W]e conclude that an individual's choice to care for a child
is not a "medical condition" related to childbirth or pregnancy.
Rather, it is a social role chosen by all new parents who make the
decision to raise a child. While the class of new parents of course
includes women who give birth to children, it also includes wo-
men who become mothers through adoption rather than child-
birth and men who become fathers through either adoption or
biology. An employer's discrimination against an employee who
has accepted this parental role-reprehensible as this discrimina-
tion might be-is therefore not based on the gender-specific bio-
logical functions of pregnancy and child-bearing, but rather is
based on a gender-neutral status potentially possessible by all em-
76. See Piantanida, 927 F. Supp. at 1235 (analyzing language of PDA).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
78. Piantanida, 927 F. Supp. at 1235.
79. See id.
80. See Piantanida v. Wyman Ctr., Inc., 116 F.3d 340 (8th Cir. 1997).
81. See id. at 342. The court stated, "We are thus faced with the narrow ques-
tion of whether being discriminated against because of one's status as a new parent
is 'because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condi-
tions. . .' and therefore violative of the PDA." Id.
82. See id. at 340.
83. See id. at 342.
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ployees, including men and women who will never be
pregnant. 84
The Eighth Circuit's decision in Piantanida is reminiscent of the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Martin Marietta, even though the Wyman Center did
not have an express policy of discriminating against mothers with young
children. In both opinions, the courts reached out to take the gender
discrimination out of the employer's policy. In Martin Marietta, the court
contended that sex-plus discrimination did not amount to sex discrimina-
tion, even though employers rarely discriminate against all women under
all circumstances. In Piantanida, the court pretended that an employer's
decision to create an inferior position for a "new mom to handle" was a
gender-neutral decision, even though employers rarely create inferior po-
sitions for new dads to handle. In each case, the court likely wished to
avoid what it perceived as the more difficult issue-in Martin Marietta,
whether the employer could actually prove that mothers of pre-school age
children were less efficient workers than fathers of pre-school age chil-
dren; in Piantanida, whether Diane Piantanida was demoted unfairly. Re-
casting and de-gendering the issue allowed the courts to cut off the
plaintiff's case before trial, before having her day in court on the core
issue of disparate treatment.
To lawyers who have followed Title VII's development, there is a cruel
irony to the holding of Piantanida. Congress enacted the PDA to amend
Title VII precisely because the Supreme Court had refused to regard dis-
crimination based on the biological condition of pregnancy as a form of
sex discrimination. 85 In the mid-1970s, it was clear that Title VII prohib-
ited the kind of disparate treatment that was not based on "real" (i.e., bio-
logical) differences between men and women. By the late 1990s, the law
has come full circle-the Piantanida court understood that Title VII
reached biologically-related conditions, but lost sight of Title VII's primary
role of eliminating discrimination based on socially-prescribed gender
roles.
Unfortunately, the holding in Piantanida has" already been cited ap-
provingly by a district court in Illinois.8 6 It likely will also have a warm
reception in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
84. Id.
85. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136, 138-40 (1976),
superceded by 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994) (holding that employer's disability benefits
plan did not violate Title VII despite failure to cover pregnancy-related disabilities,
absent indication that exclusion of pregnancy disability benefits was pretext for
more generally discriminating against women).
86. See Santrizos v. Aramark Corp., No. 96 C 8391, 1998 WL 704114 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 29, 1998) (finding Piantanida's analysis of PDA correct and concluding that
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which has been particularly resistant to sex discrimination claims by
mothers and pregnant women.8 7
Of course, not all women who allege sex discrimination based on
their status as mothers lose their disparate treatment cases. In one impor-
tant 1998 decision-Trezza v. The Hartford, Inc.8 8-a plaintiff withstood a
motion to dismiss where there was compelling direct evidence of discrimi-
nation against mothers. Joann Trezza had worked as a staff attorney for
nearly twenty years and had received promotions before she had children.
She complained that in subsequent years, after she gave birth to two chil-
dren, she was passed over for promotions in favor of women without chil-
dren, as well as men who had children.8 9
At various times, Trezza was told by the managing attorneys that "be-
cause she had family they assumed she would not be interested in the
[higher-ranked] position"90 and that once her husband (an attorney in
private practice) secured another big verdict, she "would be sitting home
eating bon bons."9 1 The managing partners also made statements that
disparaged working mothers generally, at one point stating that "women
are not good planners, especially women with kids";9 2 and at another, ex-
pressing that view that working mothers were incompetent and lazy and
cannot be both good mothers and good workers.9 3
The trial court in Trezza relied squarely on Martin Marietta to deny
defendant's motion to dismiss. Most significantly, the court refused to ac-
cept defendant's characterization of the case as one involving discrimina-
tion on the gender-neutral basis of parenthood.9 4 Instead, at the pre-trial
stage of the litigation, the court accepted plaintiff's claim that the defend-
ant's adverse actions were directed only against mothers (not fathers) and
noted that plaintiff retained her burden ultimately to prove that the sub-
class of women to which she belonged (i.e., mothers) were unfavorably
treated compared to the corresponding subclass of men (i.e., fathers).9 5
Plaintiff's direct evidence case, moreover, was bolstered by the fact that
only seven of Hartford's forty-six managing attorneys were women, and of
the four female managing attorneys on the East Coast, none were women
with children.
87. See, e.g., Ilhardt v. Sara Lee Corp., 118 F.3d 1151, 1155 (7th Cir. 1997)
(holding pregnant plaintiff could not show she was treated less favorably than simi-
larly situated, nonpregnant employees in violation of PDA); Troupe v. May Dep't
Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 735 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that plaintiff failed to estab-
lish her termination was due to pregnancy).
88. No. 98 CIV.2205 (MBM), 1998 WL 912101 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1998).
89. See id. at *1-2.
90. Id. at *1.
91. Id. at *2.
92. Id.
93. See id.
94. See id. at *5.
95. See id.
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In a few other notable recent cases, plaintiffs have also prevailed when
they offered direct statements of bias against working mothers from key
decision-makers in the company. For instance, a Pennsylvania jury
awarded a female chemical engineer a three million dollar verdict in a
promotion denial case.96 The plaintiff claimed that despite her long ser-
vice to the employer, willingness to move to different locations, and track
record of working long hours, she was passed over for promotion because
she was a single mother.9 7 She alleged that the president gave her a
choice between the "career track" or the "mommy track," and explicitly
asked her whether she wanted to have babies or a career with the defend-
ant.98 In another 1997 case against Alabama State University, the plain-
tiffs case reached the jury where she had particularly compelling direct
evidence-the Vice President for Academic Affairs had told plaintiff that
he would not consider her for Director of Admissions because she was
"married with a child" and that "a woman should stay home with her fam-
ily" and that the job "entailed too much traveling for a married mother."99
Additionally, in a 1995 case, a female associate in a New York firm with-
stood the defendant's motion for summary judgment when she alleged
that the chairman of her department remarked just prior to plaintiffs tak-
ing maternity leave that "with all these pregnant women around, I guess
we should stop hiring women."10 0
Rarely, however, do plaintiffs discover such "smoking gun" evidence
of disparate treatment. More often, there is little or no direct evidence of
discrimination and no identically situated male employee whose treatment
can be compared to the plaintiffs.' 0 ' In such cases, there is a danger that
misguided and unduly restrictive judicial -interpretations of what consti-
tutes sex discrimination under Title VII, coupled with unrealistically high
evidentiary burdens, will block recovery in disparate treatment litigation.
We are at a point at which employers may no longer explicitly refuse to
hire women with preschool-age children. We can see the ghost of Martin
Marietta, however, whenever working mothers are shunted into inferior
96. See Ann Belser, Mommy Track Wins; 3 Million Awarded to Mom Denied Promo-
tion, Pirr. POsT-GAZETrE, Apr. 30, 1999, at B1. The award was reduced to approxi-




99. Moore v. Alabama State Univ., 980 F. Supp. 426, 431, 437 (M.D. Ala.
1997).
100. Sigmon v. Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 901 F. Supp. 667, 672, 683
(S.D.N.Y. 1995); see McGrenaghan v. St. Denis Sch., 979 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. Pa.
1997) (containing direct evidence of animus against mothers with disabled
children).
101. See, e.g., Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1994)
(denying liability because there was no similarly situated nonpregnant employee to
compare to plaintiff); Bass v. Chemical Banking Corp., No. 94 CIV.8833 (SHS),
1996 WL 374151, *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 1996) (noting insufficient evidence to show
that single woman with no children got promotion).
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positions and written off as less serious employees because of unproven
assumptions about how they do or should act. In the 1990s, such em-
ployer action may be recast as the employee's personal choice and spoken
of in gender-neutral terms, as if employers typically targeted both fathers
and mothers. But whether called sex-plus or employee choice, sex-based
disparate treatment of working mothers is unfair and unequal.
The 1991 Amendments to Title VII grant plaintiffs who allege dispa-
rate treatment a right to try their claims before a jury. 10 2 In mother-dis-
crimination cases, which turn on the reasons behind the employer's
adverse treatment of the plaintiff, the jury is clearly competent to decide
disputed questions of fact and can be urged by counsel and the court not
to be swayed by stereotypes about working mothers or conventional beliefs
about sexual differences. I do not know whether plaintiffs such as Diana
Piantanida would ultimately win their cases. They should, however, be af-
forded an opportunity to convince a jury that, in their case, the work/
family conflict was all in the employer's mind.
102. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994). The text of section 1981a provides:
Damages in cases of intentional discrimination in employment
(c) Jury trial
If a complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive damages
under this section-
(1) any party may demand a trial by jury ....
Id. § 1981a(c).
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